Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games

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dc.creatorSzolnoki, Attila
dc.creatorSzabo, Gyorgy
dc.date2006-09-30
dc.date2006-10-04
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:43:05Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:43:05Z
dc.descriptionEvolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice. The rate of strategy adoption from a randomly chosen neighbors are controlled by the payoff difference and a two-value pre-factor $w$ characterizing the players whom the strategy learned from. The reduced teaching activity of players is distributed randomly with concentrations $ν$ at the beginning and fixed further on. Numerical and analytical calculations are performed to study the concentration of cooperators as a function of $w$ and $ν$ for different noise levels and connectivity structures. Significant increase of cooperation is found within a wide range of parameters for this dynamics. The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions.
dc.description4 pages, 5 figures, corrected typos
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0610001
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0610001
dc.identifierEurophysics Letters 77 (2007) 30004
dc.identifierdoi:10.1209/0295-5075/77/30004
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/122685
dc.subjectPopulations and Evolution
dc.subjectStatistical Mechanics
dc.titleCooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games
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