Experimental implementation of non-Gaussian attacks on a continuous-variable quantum key distribution system

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dc.creatorLodewyck, Jerome
dc.creatorDebuisschert, Thierry
dc.creatorGarcia-Patron, Raul
dc.creatorTualle-Brouri, Rosa
dc.creatorCerf, Nicolas J.
dc.creatorGrangier, Philippe
dc.date2007-01-31
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:44:08Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:44:08Z
dc.descriptionAn intercept-resend attack on a continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution protocol is investigated experimentally. By varying the interception fraction, one can implement a family of attacks where the eavesdropper totally controls the channel parameters. In general, such attacks add excess noise in the channel, and may also result in non-Gaussian output distributions. We implement and characterize the measurements needed to detect these attacks, and evaluate experimentally the information rates available to the legitimate users and the eavesdropper. The results are consistent with the optimality of Gaussian attacks resulting from the security proofs.
dc.description4 pages, 5 figures
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0701238
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0701238
dc.identifierPhys. Rev. Lett 98, 030503 (2007)
dc.identifierdoi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.030503
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/123087
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleExperimental implementation of non-Gaussian attacks on a continuous-variable quantum key distribution system
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