Enhancements to A Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocol

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dc.creatorZhang, Xiaowen
dc.creatorZhang, Zhanyang
dc.creatorWei, Xinzhou
dc.date2008-10-18
dc.date2008-10-25
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T10:12:47Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T10:12:47Z
dc.descriptionVajda and Buttyan (VB) proposed a set of five lightweight RFID authentication protocols. Defend, Fu, and Juels (DFJ) did cryptanalysis on two of them - XOR and SUBSET. To the XOR protocol, DFJ proposed repeated keys attack and nibble attack. In this paper, we identify the vulnerability existed in the original VB's successive session key permutation algorithm. We propose three enhancements to prevent DFJ's attacks and make XOR protocol stronger without introducing extra resource cost.
dc.description9 pages, 2 figures
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0810.3345
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0810.3345
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/172300
dc.subjectCryptography and Security
dc.titleEnhancements to A Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocol
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