Against Pointillisme about Geometry

dc.creatorButterfield, Jeremy
dc.date2005-12-07
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T06:56:09Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T06:56:09Z
dc.descriptionThis paper forms part of a wider campaign: to deny pointillisme. That is the doctrine that a physical theory's fundamental quantities are defined at points of space or of spacetime, and represent intrinsic properties of such points or point-sized objects located there; so that properties of spatial or spatiotemporal regions and their material contents are determined by the point-by-point facts. More specifically, this paper argues against pointillisme about the structure of space and-or spacetime itself, especially a paper by Bricker (1993). A companion paper argues against pointillisme in mechanics, especially about velocity; it focusses on Tooley, Robinson and Lewis. To avoid technicalities, I conduct the argument almost entirely in the context of ``Newtonian'' ideas about space and time. But both the debate and my arguments carry over to relativistic, and even quantum, physics.
dc.description37 pages Latex
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0512063
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0512063
dc.identifierForthcoming in Proceedings of the 28th Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, 2006, ed. F. Stadler and M. Stoeltzner
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/106529
dc.subjectClassical Physics
dc.subjectGeneral Physics
dc.titleAgainst Pointillisme about Geometry
dc.typetext

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