Security proof of practical quantum key distribution schemes

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dc.creatorWatanabe, Yodai
dc.date2005-06-29
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T06:13:06Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T06:13:06Z
dc.descriptionThis paper provides a security proof of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in practical implementation. To prove the security, it is not assumed that defects in the devices are absorbed into an adversary's attack. In fact, the only assumption in the proof is that the source is characterized. The proof is performed by lower-bounding adversary's Renyi entropy about the key before privacy amplification. The bound reveals the leading factors reducing the key generation rate.
dc.description5 pages, no figures
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0506246
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0506246
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/92985
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleSecurity proof of practical quantum key distribution schemes
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