Long distance decoy state quantum key distribution in optical fiber

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dc.creatorRosenberg, Danna
dc.creatorHarrington, Jim W.
dc.creatorRice, Patrick R.
dc.creatorHiskett, Philip A.
dc.creatorPeterson, Charles G.
dc.creatorHughes, Richard J.
dc.creatorLita, Adriana E.
dc.creatorNam, Sae Woo
dc.creatorNordholt, Jane E.
dc.date2006-07-26
dc.date2007-05-02
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T08:21:13Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T08:21:13Z
dc.descriptionThe theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a security loophole for most quantum key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that use a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultra-low-noise, high-efficiency transition-edge sensor photodetectors, we have implemented the first version of a decoy-state protocol that incorporates finite statistics without the use of Gaussian approximations in a one-way QKD system, enabling the creation of secure keys immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and highly resistant to Trojan horse attacks over 107 km of optical fiber.
dc.description4 pages, 3 figures
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0607186
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0607186
dc.identifierPhys. Rev. Lett. 98 010503 (2007)
dc.identifierdoi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.010503
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/135291
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleLong distance decoy state quantum key distribution in optical fiber
dc.typetext

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