Towards Exploring Fundamental Limits of System-Specific Cryptanalysis Within Limited Attack Classes: Application to ABSG
| dc.creator | Altug, Yucel | |
| dc.creator | Mihcak, M. Kivanc | |
| dc.date | 2008-05-02 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T09:36:41Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T09:36:41Z | |
| dc.description | A new approach on cryptanalysis is proposed where the goal is to explore the fundamental limits of a specific class of attacks against a particular cryptosystem. As a first step, the approach is applied on ABSG, which is an LFSR-based stream cipher where irregular decimation techniques are utilized. Consequently, under some mild assumptions, which are common in cryptanalysis, the tight lower bounds on the algorithmic complexity of successful Query-Based Key-Recovery attacks are derived for two different setups of practical interest. The proofs rely on the concept of ``typicality'' of information theory. | |
| dc.description | 30 pages, Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theory | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/0805.0268 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/0805.0268 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/160202 | |
| dc.subject | Cryptography and Security | |
| dc.subject | Information Theory | |
| dc.title | Towards Exploring Fundamental Limits of System-Specific Cryptanalysis Within Limited Attack Classes: Application to ABSG | |
| dc.type | text |