Iterated Regret Minimization: A More Realistic Solution Concept

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dc.creatorHalpern, Joseph Y.
dc.creatorPass, Rafael
dc.date2008-10-16
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T10:10:53Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T10:10:53Z
dc.descriptionFor some well-known games, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts--and most notably Nash equilibrium--predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. In this paper, we introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, including Traveler's Dilemma, the Centipede Game, Nash bargaining, and Bertrand competition. As the name suggests, iterated regret minimization involves the iterated deletion of strategies that do not minimize regret.
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0810.3023
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0810.3023
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/171722
dc.subjectComputer Science and Game Theory
dc.titleIterated Regret Minimization: A More Realistic Solution Concept
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