Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium
| dc.creator | Miekisz, Jacek | |
| dc.creator | Platkowski, Tadeusz | |
| dc.date | 2007-03-27 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T07:54:11Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T07:54:11Z | |
| dc.description | We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two evolutionarily stable strategies: the efficient one in which the population is in a state with a maximal payoff and the risk-dominant one where players are averse to risk. We show that for a large range of parameters of our dynamics, even if the initial conditions in both habitats are in the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium (with respect to the standard replication dynamics without migration), in the long run most individuals play the efficient strategy. | |
| dc.description | 12 pages | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0703057 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0703057 | |
| dc.identifier | J. Theor. Biol. 237: 363 - 368 (2005) | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/126504 | |
| dc.subject | Populations and Evolution | |
| dc.title | Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium | |
| dc.type | text |