On measures of unfairness and an optimal currency transaction tax

dc.creatorHerzberg, Frederik
dc.date2004-10-25
dc.date2005-06-15
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T05:13:42Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T05:13:42Z
dc.descriptionThe purpose of the present paper is the analysis of a model describing how herd behaviour and self-fulfilling prophecies can influence currency exchange rates, and what the impact of a currency transaction tax would be. These considerations yield a stochastic differential equation that can be studied using the methods of infinitesimal analysis. We will show, using a suitable notion of unfairness for discounted price processes which measures the distance from being a martingale, that the fairest tax rate is the maximal one subject to the condition that it does not affect real-economic speculation.
dc.descriptionminor changes
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/math/0410543
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/math/0410543
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/73006
dc.subjectProbability
dc.subjectOptimization and Control
dc.subjectPrimary 60G44, 91B24; Secondary 91B28
dc.titleOn measures of unfairness and an optimal currency transaction tax
dc.typetext

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