Rent seeking games with tax evasion

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dc.creatorBundau, O.
dc.creatorNeamtu, M.
dc.creatorOpris, D.
dc.date2007-06-05
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T12:05:15Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T12:05:15Z
dc.descriptionWe consider the static and dynamic models of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion. In the dynamic model we introduce the time delay and we analyze the local stability of the stationary state. There is a critical value of the delay when the Hopf bifurcation occurs.
dc.description8 pages, 4 figures, the paper was presented at Pannonian Applied Mathematical Meetings, 31 may-3june, 2007
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0706.0664
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0706.0664
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/208328
dc.subjectDynamical Systems
dc.subjectGeneral Finance
dc.subject34K18, 47N10
dc.titleRent seeking games with tax evasion
dc.typetext

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