Analysis of Norms Game in networked societies
| dc.creator | Sobkowicz, Pawel | |
| dc.date | 2003-10-19 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T02:54:18Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T02:54:18Z | |
| dc.description | Norms, defined as generally accepted behaviour in societies without central authority (and thus distinguished from laws), are very powerful mechanism leading to coherent behaviour of the society members. This paper examines, within a simple numerical simulation, the various effects that may lead to norm formation and stability. The approach has been first used by Axelrod, who proposed two step model of norm and meta-norm enforcement. We present here an extension and detailed analysis of the original work, as well as several new ideas that may bear on the norm establishment mechanisms in societies. It turns out that a relatively simple model for simulated norm enforcement predicts persistent norm breaking even when it is associated with high punishment levels. The key factors appear to be the combination of the level of penalty for breaking the norm and proximity of norm enforcers. We also study a totally different mechanism of norm establishment, without meta-norms but using instead the direct bonus mechanism to norm-enforcers. | |
| dc.description | 19 pages, 5 figures | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0310444 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0310444 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/22489 | |
| dc.subject | Disordered Systems and Neural Networks | |
| dc.subject | Populations and Evolution | |
| dc.title | Analysis of Norms Game in networked societies | |
| dc.type | text |