Beyond Nash Equilibrium: Solution Concepts for the 21st Century

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dc.creatorHalpern, Joseph Y.
dc.date2008-06-12
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T12:19:30Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T12:19:30Z
dc.descriptionNash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma is neither normatively nor descriptively reasonable. However, new problems arise when considering Nash equilibrium from a computer science perspective: for example, Nash equilibrium is not robust (it does not tolerate ``faulty'' or ``unexpected'' behavior), it does not deal with coalitions, it does not take computation cost into account, and it does not deal with cases where players are not aware of all aspects of the game. Solution concepts that try to address these shortcomings of Nash equilibrium are discussed.
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0806.2139
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0806.2139
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/212777
dc.subjectComputer Science and Game Theory
dc.subjectArtificial Intelligence
dc.subjectCryptography and Security
dc.subjectDistributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
dc.subjectC.2.4; F.0; I.2.11; J.4
dc.titleBeyond Nash Equilibrium: Solution Concepts for the 21st Century
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