Quantum games and social norms. The quantum ultimatum game

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dc.creatorMendes, R. Vilela
dc.date2002-08-27
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T06:34:03Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T06:34:03Z
dc.descriptionThe noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution of classical games corresponds to a rational expectations attitude on the part of the players. However, in many cases, games played by human players have outcomes very different from Nash equilibria. A restricted version of quantum games is proposed to implement, in mathematical games, the interplay of self-interest and internalized social norms that rules human behavior.
dc.description6 pages Latex
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0208167
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0208167
dc.identifierQuantum Information Processing 4 (2005) 1-12
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/99402
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleQuantum games and social norms. The quantum ultimatum game
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