Prisoner's Dilemma: non-trivial results for the lowest temptation level in the Darwinian and Pavlovian evolutionary strategies

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dc.creatorPereira, Marcelo Alves
dc.creatorMartinez, Alexandre Souto
dc.date2009-04-03
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T13:00:11Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T13:00:11Z
dc.descriptionThe lowest temptation level (T = 1) is considered a trivial case for the Prisoner's Dilemma. Here, we show that this statement is true only for a very particular case, where the players interact with only one player. Otherwise, if the players interact with more than one player, the system presents the same possible behaviors observed for $T > 1$. In the steady state, the system can reach the cooperative, chaotic or defective phases, when adopting the Darwinian Evolutionary Strategy and the cooperative or quasi-regular phases, adopting the Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy.
dc.description5 pages, 2 color figures, submitted to EPJB
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0904.0490
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0904.0490
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/225780
dc.subjectPhysics and Society
dc.subjectComputational Physics
dc.titlePrisoner's Dilemma: non-trivial results for the lowest temptation level in the Darwinian and Pavlovian evolutionary strategies
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