Influence of initial distributions on robust cooperation in evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma

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dc.creatorChen, Xiaojie
dc.creatorFu, Feng
dc.creatorWang, Long
dc.date2007-01-29
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T08:39:59Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T08:39:59Z
dc.descriptionWe study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on scale-free networks for different initial distributions. We consider three types of initial distributions for cooperators and defectors: initially random distribution with different frequencies of defectors; intentional organization with defectors initially occupying the most connected nodes with different fractions of defectors; intentional assignment for cooperators occupying the most connected nodes with different proportions of defectors at the beginning. It is shown that initial configurations for cooperators and defectors can influence the stationary level of cooperation and the evolution speed of cooperation. Organizations with the vertices with highest connectivity representing individuals cooperators could exhibit the most robust cooperation and drive evolutionary process to converge fastest to the high steady cooperation in the three situations of initial distributions. Otherwise, we determine the critical initial frequencies of defectors above which the extinction of cooperators occurs for the respective initial distributions, and find that the presence of network loops and clusters for cooperators can favor the emergence of cooperation.
dc.descriptionSubmitted to EPL
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0701318
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0701318
dc.identifierdoi:10.1016/j.physleta.2007.09.044
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/141266
dc.subjectPhysics and Society
dc.titleInfluence of initial distributions on robust cooperation in evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma
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