Quantum-Space Attacks
| dc.creator | Gelles, Ran | |
| dc.creator | Mor, Tal | |
| dc.date | 2007-11-19 | |
| dc.date | 2007-11-25 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T08:44:24Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T08:44:24Z | |
| dc.description | Theoretical quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols commonly rely on the use of qubits (quantum bits). In reality, however, due to practical limitations, the legitimate users are forced to employ a larger quantum (Hilbert) space, say a quhexit (quantum six-dimensional) space, or even a much larger quantum Hilbert space. Various specific attacks exploit of these limitations. Although security can still be proved in some very special cases, a general framework that considers such realistic QKD protocols, as well as} attacks on such protocols, is still missing. We describe a general method of attacking realistic QKD protocols, which we call the `quantum-space attack'. The description is based on assessing the enlarged quantum space actually used by a protocol, the `quantum space of the protocol'. We demonstrate these new methods by classifying various (known) recent attacks against several QKD schemes, and by analyzing a novel attack on interferometry-based QKD. | |
| dc.description | 25 pages, 3 figures. An improved and slightly longer version | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/0711.3019 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/0711.3019 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/142643 | |
| dc.subject | Quantum Physics | |
| dc.title | Quantum-Space Attacks | |
| dc.type | text |