Security Notions for Quantum Public-Key Cryptography
| dc.creator | Koshiba, Takeshi | |
| dc.date | 2007-02-19 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T07:47:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T07:47:38Z | |
| dc.description | It is well known that Shor's quantum algorithm for integer factorization can break down the RSA public-key cryptosystem, which is widely used in many cryptographic applications. Thus, public-key cryptosystems in the quantum computational setting are longed for cryptology. In order to define the security notions of public-key cryptosystems, we have to model the power of the sender, receiver, adversary and channel. While we may consider a setting where quantum computers are available only to adversaries, we generally discuss what are the right security notions for (quantum) public-key cryptosystems in the quantum computational setting. Moreover, we consider the security of quantum public-key cryptosystems known so far. | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702183 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702183 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/124236 | |
| dc.subject | Quantum Physics | |
| dc.title | Security Notions for Quantum Public-Key Cryptography | |
| dc.type | text |