Quantifying Timing Leaks and Cost Optimisation

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dc.creatorDi Pierro, Alessandra
dc.creatorHankin, Chris
dc.creatorWiklicky, Herbert
dc.date2008-07-24
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T09:52:36Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T09:52:36Z
dc.descriptionWe develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of a program with respect to this notion via a computable estimate of the timing leakage and use this estimate for cost optimisation.
dc.description16 pages, 2 figures, 4 tables. A shorter version is included in the proceedings of ICICS'08 - 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, 20-22 October, 2008 Birmingham, UK
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3879
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3879
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/165654
dc.subjectCryptography and Security
dc.subjectProgramming Languages
dc.titleQuantifying Timing Leaks and Cost Optimisation
dc.typetext

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