Computing the biases of parity-check relations
| dc.creator | Canteaut, Anne | |
| dc.creator | Naya-Plasencia, Maria | |
| dc.date | 2009-04-28 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T13:09:26Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T13:09:26Z | |
| dc.description | A divide-and-conquer cryptanalysis can often be mounted against some keystream generators composed of several (nonlinear) independent devices combined by a Boolean function. In particular, any parity-check relation derived from the periods of some constituent sequences usually leads to a distinguishing attack whose complexity is determined by the bias of the relation. However, estimating this bias is a difficult problem since the piling-up lemma cannot be used. Here, we give two exact expressions for this bias. Most notably, these expressions lead to a new algorithm for computing the bias of a parity-check relation, and they also provide some simple formulae for this bias in some particular cases which are commonly used in cryptography. | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/0904.4412 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/0904.4412 | |
| dc.identifier | 2009 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT2009), Seoul : Corée, République de (2009) | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/228736 | |
| dc.subject | Cryptography and Security | |
| dc.title | Computing the biases of parity-check relations | |
| dc.type | text |