Godel's theorem as a corollary of impossibility of complete axiomatization of geometry

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dc.creatorRylov, Yuri A.
dc.date2007-09-06
dc.date2007-09-24
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T08:31:19Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T08:31:19Z
dc.descriptionNot any geometry can be axiomatized. The paradoxical Godel's theorem starts from the supposition that any geometry can be axiomatized and goes to the result, that not any geometry can be axiomatized. One considers example of two close geometries (Riemannian geometry and $σ$-Riemannian one), which are constructed by different methods and distinguish in some details. The Riemannian geometry reminds such a geometry, which is only a part of the full geometry. Such a possibility is covered by the Godel's theorem.
dc.description15 pages, 0 figures, correction of misprints
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0709.0783
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0709.0783
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/138470
dc.subjectGeneral Mathematics
dc.subject03F40; 51K99; 51F99
dc.titleGodel's theorem as a corollary of impossibility of complete axiomatization of geometry
dc.typetext

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