Security against eavesdropping in quantum cryptography
| dc.creator | Lütkenhaus, N. | |
| dc.creator | Barnett, Stephen M. | |
| dc.date | 1997-11-18 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T06:14:33Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T06:14:33Z | |
| dc.description | In this article we deal with the security of the BB84 quantum cryptography protocol over noisy channels using generalized privacy amplification. For this we estimate the fraction of bits needed to be discarded during the privacy amplification step. This estimate is given for two scenarios, both of which assume the eavesdropper to access each of the signals independently and take error correction into account. One scenario does not allow a delay of the eavesdropper's measurement of a measurement probe until he receives additional classical information. In this scenario we achieve a sharp bound. The other scenario allows a measurement delay, so that the general attack of an eavesdropper on individual signals is covered. This bound is not sharp but allows a practical implementation of the protocol. | |
| dc.description | 11 pages including 3 figures, contains new results not contained in my Phys. Rev. A paper | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9711033 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9711033 | |
| dc.identifier | Proceedings of an International Workshop on Quantum Communication, Computing, and Measurement, held September 25-30 1996 in Shizuoka, Japan, Plenum Press, New York (1997) | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/93505 | |
| dc.subject | Quantum Physics | |
| dc.title | Security against eavesdropping in quantum cryptography | |
| dc.type | text |