Comments on evolution of cooperation: assortative encounters with selfknowledge

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dc.creatorSobkowicz, Pawel
dc.date2003-10-09
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T02:54:06Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T02:54:06Z
dc.descriptionThe theoretical description of the evolution of cooperation presented by Bergstrom based on assortative matching with partner choice allows to model the population dynamics in a game of Nonrepetitive Prisoners Dilemma. In this paper we present a short analysis of asymmetric effects brought into the game by self knowledge of the participants, that is the knowledge of one's own strategy. Within the same conceptual framework as introduced by Bergstrom inclusion of selfknowledge leads to different behaviour of the assortativity index and changes in payoffs for different strategies.
dc.description19 pages, 6 figures
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0310208
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0310208
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/22409
dc.subjectDisordered Systems and Neural Networks
dc.subjectPopulations and Evolution
dc.titleComments on evolution of cooperation: assortative encounters with selfknowledge
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