Equilibrium transitions in finite populations of players

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dc.creatorMiekisz, Jacek
dc.date2004-12-20
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T05:58:50Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T05:58:50Z
dc.descriptionWe discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of two-player games with two symmetric Nash equilibria, when the number of players increases, the population undergoes multiple transitions between its equilibria.
dc.description8 pages
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0412038
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0412038
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/88508
dc.subjectPopulations and Evolution
dc.titleEquilibrium transitions in finite populations of players
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