Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation

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dc.creatorSzolnoki, Attila
dc.creatorPerc, Matjaz
dc.date2008-03-28
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T09:33:56Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T09:33:56Z
dc.descriptionEvolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied with an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.
dc.description10 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physics
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0803.4091
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0803.4091
dc.identifierNew J. Phys. 10 (2008) 043036
dc.identifierdoi:10.1088/1367-2630/10/4/043036
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/159309
dc.subjectPhysics and Society
dc.subjectGeneral Physics
dc.subjectPopulations and Evolution
dc.titleCoevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation
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