Replicator dynamics with mutations for games with a continuous strategy space
| dc.creator | Ruijgrok, M. | |
| dc.creator | Ruijgrok, T. W. | |
| dc.date | 2005-05-12 | |
| dc.date | 2005-05-13 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T05:36:28Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T05:36:28Z | |
| dc.description | A partial differential equation is derived, describing the replicator dynamics with mutations of games with a continuous strategy space. This equation is then applied to continuous versions of symmetric 2x2 games, such as the Prisoners Dilemma, Hawk-Dove and Coordination games, and to the Ultimatum Game. In the latter case, we find that adding even a small mutation term to the replicator equation leads to a solution where the average offer is significantly larger than zero. | |
| dc.description | 26 pages, 10 figures | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/nlin/0505032 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/nlin/0505032 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/81007 | |
| dc.subject | Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems | |
| dc.title | Replicator dynamics with mutations for games with a continuous strategy space | |
| dc.type | text |