Objective Bayesian Statistics

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dc.creatorAl-Hujaj, O. -A.
dc.creatorHarney, H. L.
dc.date1997-06-18
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T09:16:17Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T09:16:17Z
dc.descriptionBayesian inference --- although becoming popular in physics and chemistry --- is hampered up to now by the vagueness of its notion of prior probability. Some of its supporters argue that this vagueness is the unavoidable consequence of the subjectivity of judgements --- even scientific ones. We argue that priors can be defined uniquely if the statistical model at hand possesses a symmetry and if the ensuing confidence intervals are subjected to a frequentist criterion. Moreover, it is shown via an example taken from recent experimental nuclear physics, that this procedure can be extended to models with broken symmetry.
dc.description8 pages, RevTeX, 1 figure submitted to Phys. Rev. Let
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/physics/9706025
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/physics/9706025
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/153307
dc.subjectData Analysis, Statistics and Probability
dc.titleObjective Bayesian Statistics
dc.typetext

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