Contextual objectivity and the quantum formalism
| dc.creator | Grangier, Philippe | |
| dc.date | 2004-07-03 | |
| dc.date | 2004-09-18 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T06:10:10Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T06:10:10Z | |
| dc.description | The new orthodoxy of quantum mechanics (QM) based on the decoherence approach requires many-worlds as an essential ingredient for logical consistency, and one may wonder what status to give to all these "other worlds". Here we advocate that it is possible to build a consistent approach to QM where no other worlds are needed, and where the quantum formalism appears as a consequence of requiring the enumerability of physical properties. Such a quantization hypothesis is closely related to indistinguishability, and is deeply inconsistent with classical physics. | |
| dc.description | 3 pages, no figure. To appear in the Proceedings of the conference "Foundations of Quantum Information" (April 2004, Camerino, Italy). In v2 some clarifications and references added | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0407025 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0407025 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/92189 | |
| dc.subject | Quantum Physics | |
| dc.title | Contextual objectivity and the quantum formalism | |
| dc.type | text |