Convergence to Equilibrium in Local Interaction Games and Ising Models
Abstract
Description
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we consider a two-strategies coordination game played asynchronously between the nodes of a network. Agents behave according to a noisy best-response dynamics.
It is known that noise removes the degeneracy among equilibria: In the long run, the ``risk-dominant'' behavior spreads throughout the network. Here we consider the problem of computing the typical time scale for the spread of this behavior. In particular, we study its dependence on the network structure and derive a dichotomy between highly-connected, non-local graphs that show slow convergence, and poorly connected, low dimensional graphs that show fast convergence.
17 pages, 2 eps figures
17 pages, 2 eps figures