Putting the prisoner's dilemma in context

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dc.creatorKhodarinova, L. A.
dc.creatorWebb, J. N.
dc.date2004-06-29
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T05:09:49Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T05:09:49Z
dc.descriptionThe standard iterated prisoner's dilemma is an unrealistic model of social behaviour because it forces individuals to participate in the interaction. We analyse a model in which players have the option of ending their association. If the payoff for living alone is neither too high nor too low then the potential for cooperative behaviour is enhanced. For some parameter values it is also possible for a polymorphic population of defectors and conditional cooperators to be stable.
dc.description11 pages, 4 figures
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/math/0406597
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/math/0406597
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/71723
dc.subjectOptimization and Control
dc.subject91A22
dc.titlePutting the prisoner's dilemma in context
dc.typetext

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