Two presumptions in Goedel's interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning that are classically objectionable

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dc.creatorAnand, Bhupinder Singh
dc.date2007-03-24
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:53:52Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:53:52Z
dc.descriptionStandard expositions of Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions are based on two presumptions in Goedel's 1931 interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning - one each in Theorem VI and in Theorem XI - which do not meet Goedel's, explicitly stated, requirement of classically constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, reasoning. We see how these objections can be addressed, and note some consequences.
dc.description26 pages; an HTML version is available at http://alixcomsi.com/Two_Presumptions.htm
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/math/0703723
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/math/0703723
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/126387
dc.subjectGeneral Mathematics
dc.subject03B10
dc.titleTwo presumptions in Goedel's interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning that are classically objectionable
dc.typetext

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