Optimal stopping in a two-sided secretary problem
| dc.creator | Eriksson, Kimmo | |
| dc.creator | Sjostrand, Jonas | |
| dc.creator | Strimling, Pontus | |
| dc.date | 2004-11-09 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T05:14:09Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T05:14:09Z | |
| dc.description | In the "secretary problem", well-known in the theory of optimal stopping, an employer is about to interview a maximum of N secretaries about which she has no prior information. Chow et al. proved that with an optimal strategy the expected rank of the chosen secretary tends to approximately 3.87. We study a two-sided game-theoretic version of this optimal stopping problem, where men search for a woman to marry at the same time as women search for a man to marry. We find that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the expected rank grows as the square root of N and that, surprisingly, the leading coefficient is exactly 1. We also discuss some possible variations. | |
| dc.description | 16 pages | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0411212 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0411212 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/73168 | |
| dc.subject | Combinatorics | |
| dc.subject | 91B40; 91A15, 91B08 | |
| dc.title | Optimal stopping in a two-sided secretary problem | |
| dc.type | text |