Device-independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks

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dc.creatorPironio, Stefano
dc.creatorAcin, Antonio
dc.creatorBrunner, Nicolas
dc.creatorGisin, Nicolas
dc.creatorMassar, Serge
dc.creatorScarani, Valerio
dc.date2009-03-25
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T13:09:49Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T13:09:49Z
dc.descriptionDevice-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) represents a relaxation of the security assumptions made in usual quantum key distribution (QKD). As in usual QKD, the security of DIQKD follows from the laws of quantum physics, but contrary to usual QKD, it does not rely on any assumptions about the internal working of the quantum devices used in the protocol. We present here in detail the security proof for a DIQKD protocol introduced in [Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501 (2008)]. This proof exploits the full structure of quantum theory (as opposed to other proofs that exploit the no-signalling principle only), but only holds again collective attacks, where the eavesdropper is assumed to act on the quantum systems of the honest parties independently and identically at each round of the protocol (although she can act coherently on her systems at any time). The security of any DIQKD protocol necessarily relies on the violation of a Bell inequality. We discuss the issue of loopholes in Bell experiments in this context.
dc.description25 pages, 3 figures
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0903.4460
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0903.4460
dc.identifierNew J. Phys. 11, 045021 (2009)
dc.identifierdoi:10.1088/1367-2630/11/4/045021
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/228863
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleDevice-independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks
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