Questions for a Materialist Philosophy Implying the Equivalence of Computers and Human Cognition

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dc.creatorSnyder, Douglas M.
dc.date2000-12-11
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T03:16:47Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T03:16:47Z
dc.descriptionIssues related to a materialist philosophy are explored as concerns the implied equivalence of computers running software and human observers. One issue explored concerns the measurement process in quantum mechanics. Another issue explored concerns the nature of experience as revealed by the existence of dreams. Some difficulties stemming from a materialist philosophy as regards these issues are pointed out. For example, a gedankenexperiment involving what has been called "negative" observation is discussed that illustrates the difficulty with a materialist assumption in quantum mechanics. Based on an exploration of these difficulties, specifications are outlined briefly that would provide a means to demonstrate the equivalence of of computers running software and human experience given a materialist assumption.
dc.description20 pages
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0012003
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0012003
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/30484
dc.subjectGeneral Literature
dc.subjectA.0
dc.titleQuestions for a Materialist Philosophy Implying the Equivalence of Computers and Human Cognition
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