Beamsplitting attack to the revised KKKP protocol and a possible solution

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dc.creatorWang, Xiang-Bin
dc.creatorZhang, Qiang
dc.creatorChen, Yu-Ao
dc.creatorHwang, Wong-Young
dc.creatorKim, Myungshik
dc.creatorPan, Jian-Wei
dc.date2006-03-01
dc.date2006-03-15
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:07:56Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:07:56Z
dc.descriptionWe show that the revised KKKP protocol proposed by Kye and Kim [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,040501(2005)] is still insecure with coherent states by a type of beamsplitting attack. We then further revise the KKKP protocol so that it is secure under such type of beamsplitting attack. The revised scheme can be used for not-so-weak coherent state quantum key distribution.
dc.description6pages, 1 figure
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0603010
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0603010
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/110574
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleBeamsplitting attack to the revised KKKP protocol and a possible solution
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