Notes On The Design Of An Internet Adversary

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dc.creatorRosenthal, David S. H.
dc.creatorManiatis, Petros
dc.creatorRoussopoulos, Mema
dc.creatorGiuli, T. J.
dc.creatorBaker, Mary
dc.date2004-11-22
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T03:22:04Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T03:22:04Z
dc.descriptionThe design of the defenses Internet systems can deploy against attack, especially adaptive and resilient defenses, must start from a realistic model of the threat. This requires an assessment of the capabilities of the adversary. The design typically evolves through a process of simulating both the system and the adversary. This requires the design and implementation of a simulated adversary based on the capability assessment. Consensus on the capabilities of a suitable adversary is not evident. Part of the recent redesign of the protocol used by peers in the LOCKSS digital preservation system included a conservative assessment of the adversary's capabilities. We present our assessment and the implications we drew from it as a step towards a reusable adversary specification.
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0411078
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0411078
dc.identifierSecond Annual Adaptive and Resilient Computing Security Workshop, Santa Fe, 2003
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/32453
dc.subjectDigital Libraries
dc.subjectH.3.7
dc.titleNotes On The Design Of An Internet Adversary
dc.typetext

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