Towards Barter Double Auction as Model for Bilateral Social Cooperations
| dc.creator | Tagiew, Rustam | |
| dc.date | 2009-05-22 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T13:17:35Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T13:17:35Z | |
| dc.description | The idea of this paper is an advanced game concept. This concept is expected to model non-monetary bilateral cooperations between self-interested agents. Such non-monetary cases are social cooperations like allocation of high level jobs or sexual relationships among humans. In a barter double auction, there is a big amount of agents. Every agent has a vector of parameters which specifies his demand and a vector which specifies his offer. Two agents can achieve a commitment through barter exchange. The subjective satisfaction level (a number between 0% and 100%) of an agent is as high as small is the distance between his demand and the accepted offer. This paper introduces some facets of this complex game concept. | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/0905.3709 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.3709 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/231159 | |
| dc.subject | Computer Science and Game Theory | |
| dc.title | Towards Barter Double Auction as Model for Bilateral Social Cooperations | |
| dc.type | text |