On Competing Wireless Service Providers

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We consider a situation where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their willingness to pay as well as in their individual channel gains. We prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the competition of two service providers, for a generic channel model. Interestingly, the competition of two providers leads to a globally optimal outcome. We extend some of the results to the case where more than two providers are competing. Finally, we provide numerical examples that illustrate the effects of various parameters on the Nash equilibrium.

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Information Theory, Computer Science and Game Theory

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http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/223047

Consulte el texto completo en el siguiente enlace:

https://arxiv.org/abs/0903.1972
 http://arxiv.org/abs/0903.1972

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arXiv