The Doomsday Argument, Consciousness and Many Worlds
| dc.creator | Eastmond, John F. G. | |
| dc.date | 2002-08-15 | |
| dc.date | 2002-10-05 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T03:27:05Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T03:27:05Z | |
| dc.description | The doomsday argument is a probabilistic argument that claims to predict the total lifetime of the human race. By examining the case of an individual lifetime, I conclude that the argument is fundamentally related to consciousness. I derive a reformulation stating that an infinite conscious lifetime is not possible even in principle. By considering a hypothetical conscious computer, running a non-terminating program, I deduce that consciousness cannot be generated by a single set of deterministic laws. Instead, I hypothesize that consciousness is generated by a superposition of brain states that is simultaneously associated with many quasi-classical histories, each following a different set of deterministic laws. I generalize the doomsday argument and discover that it makes no prediction in this case. Thus I conclude that the very fact of our consciousness provides us with evidence for a many-worlds interpretation of reality in which our future is not predictable using anthropic reasoning. | |
| dc.description | LaTeX2e, 30 pages | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0208038 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0208038 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/34296 | |
| dc.subject | General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology | |
| dc.title | The Doomsday Argument, Consciousness and Many Worlds | |
| dc.type | text |