Stochastic stability in three-player games
| dc.creator | Kaminski, Dominik | |
| dc.creator | Miekisz, Jacek | |
| dc.creator | Zaborowski, Marcin | |
| dc.date | 2004-12-22 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T05:58:50Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T05:58:50Z | |
| dc.description | Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only recently evolutionarily stable strategies were defined for multi-player games and their properties analyzed (Broom et al., 1997). Here we study the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of populations of randomly matched individuals playing symmetric three-player games. We analyze stochastic stability of equilibria in games with multiple evolutionarily stable strategies. We also show that in some games, a population may not evolve in the long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. | |
| dc.description | 18 pages | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0412041 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0412041 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/88509 | |
| dc.subject | Populations and Evolution | |
| dc.title | Stochastic stability in three-player games | |
| dc.type | text |