Dynamics of Individual Specialization and Global Diversification in Communities

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dc.creatorBorkar, Vivek S.
dc.creatorJain, Sanjay
dc.creatorRangarajan, Govindan
dc.date1998-04-30
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T01:50:57Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T01:50:57Z
dc.descriptionWe discuss a model of an economic community consisting of $N$ interacting agents. The state of each agent at any time is characterized, in general, by a mixed strategy profile drawn from a space of $s$ pure strategies. The community evolves as agents update their strategy profiles in response to payoffs received from other agents. The evolution equation is a generalization of the replicator equation. We argue that when $N$ is sufficiently large and the payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities, the community evolves to retain the full diversity of available strategies even as individual agents specialize to pure strategies.
dc.description13 pages, Latex
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/adap-org/9804004
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/adap-org/9804004
dc.identifierComplexity, Vol. 3, No. 3, 50-56 (1998)
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/169
dc.subjectAdaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
dc.subjectCondensed Matter
dc.titleDynamics of Individual Specialization and Global Diversification in Communities
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