Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
| dc.creator | Baek, Seung Ki | |
| dc.creator | Kim, Beom Jun | |
| dc.date | 2008-07-14 | |
| dc.date | 2008-07-30 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T09:53:26Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T09:53:26Z | |
| dc.description | We seek a route to the equilibrium where all the agents cooperate in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game on a two-dimensional plane, focusing on the role of tit-for-tat strategy. When a time horizon, within which a strategy can recall the past, is one time step, an equilibrium can be achieved as cooperating strategies dominate the whole population via proliferation of tit-for-tat. Extending the time horizon, we filter out poor strategies by simplified replicator dynamics and observe a similar evolutionary pattern to reach the cooperating equilibrium. In particular, the rise of a modified tit-for-tat strategy plays a central role, which implies how a robust strategy is adopted when provided with an enhanced memory capacity. | |
| dc.description | 9 pages, 14 figures | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/0807.2105 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.2105 | |
| dc.identifier | Physical Review E 78, 011125 (2008) | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.78.011125 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/165953 | |
| dc.subject | Populations and Evolution | |
| dc.title | Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game | |
| dc.type | text |