Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems

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dc.creatorMakarov, Vadim
dc.creatorAnisimov, Andrey
dc.creatorSkaar, Johannes
dc.date2005-11-03
dc.date2007-03-06
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:50:18Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:50:18Z
dc.descriptionWe suggest a type of attack on quantum cryptosystems that exploits variations in detector efficiency as a function of a control parameter accessible to an eavesdropper. With gated single-photon detectors, this control parameter can be the timing of the incoming pulse. When the eavesdropper sends short pulses using the appropriate timing so that the two gated detectors in Bob's setup have different efficiencies, the security of quantum key distribution can be compromised. Specifically, we show for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol that if the efficiency mismatch between 0 and 1 detectors for some value of the control parameter gets large enough (roughly 15:1 or larger), Eve can construct a successful faked-states attack causing a quantum bit error rate lower than 11%. We also derive a general security bound as a function of the detector sensitivity mismatch for the BB84 protocol. Experimental data for two different detectors are presented, and protection measures against this attack are discussed.
dc.descriptionv3: identical to the journal version. However, after publication we have discovered that Eq. 11 is incorrect: the available bit rate after privacy amplification is reduced even in the case (QBER)=0 [see Quant. Inf. Comp. 7, 73 (2007)]
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0511032
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0511032
dc.identifierPhys. Rev. A 74, 022313 (2006)
dc.identifierdoi:10.1103/PhysRevA.74.022313
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/125118
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleEffects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems
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