2026-07-072026-07-07http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/67171We consider a philosophical question that is implicit in Selmer Bringsjord's paper, "The narrational case against Church's Thesis": If, as Mendelson argues, the classically accepted definitions of foundational concepts such as "partial recursive function", "function", "(Tarskian) truth", "set" etc. are vague and imprecise - hence possibly non-constructive and intuitionistically objectionable - then replacing one non-constructive concept by another may be psychologically unappealing, but it should be meta-mathematically valid and acceptable.v2; introduced standardised ACI compliant notation for citations; 11 pages; an HTML version is available at http://alixcomsi.com/CTG_06_Consequences_Bringsjord.htmGeneral Mathematics03B10Is there a duality in the classical acceptance of non-constructive, foundational, concepts as axiomatic?text