2026-07-072026-07-07http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/122685Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice. The rate of strategy adoption from a randomly chosen neighbors are controlled by the payoff difference and a two-value pre-factor $w$ characterizing the players whom the strategy learned from. The reduced teaching activity of players is distributed randomly with concentrations $ν$ at the beginning and fixed further on. Numerical and analytical calculations are performed to study the concentration of cooperators as a function of $w$ and $ν$ for different noise levels and connectivity structures. Significant increase of cooperation is found within a wide range of parameters for this dynamics. The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions.4 pages, 5 figures, corrected typosPopulations and EvolutionStatistical Mechanicstext