Incentive Systems in Multi-Level Markets for Virtual Goods
Abstract
Description
As an alternative to rigid DRM measures, ways of marketing virtual goods through multi-level or networked marketing have raised some interest. This report is a first approach to multi-level markets for virtual goods from the viewpoint of theoretical economy. A generic, kinematic model for the monetary flow in multi-level markets, which quantitatively describes the incentives that buyers receive through resales revenues, is devised. Building on it, the competition of goods is examined in a dynamical, utility-theoretic model enabling, in particular, a treatment of the free-rider problem. The most important implications for the design of multi-level market mechanisms for virtual goods, or multi-level incentive management systems, are outlined.
18 pages, 5 figures; graphics with reduced resolution. Full resolution available on author's homepage. Accepted contribution to the Workshop 'Virtual Goods' at the Conference AXMEDIS 2005, 30. November - 2. December, Florence, Italy
18 pages, 5 figures; graphics with reduced resolution. Full resolution available on author's homepage. Accepted contribution to the Workshop 'Virtual Goods' at the Conference AXMEDIS 2005, 30. November - 2. December, Florence, Italy