Incentive Systems in Multi-Level Markets for Virtual Goods
| dc.creator | Schmidt, Andreas U. | |
| dc.date | 2004-09-14 | |
| dc.date | 2005-06-17 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T03:21:47Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T03:21:47Z | |
| dc.description | As an alternative to rigid DRM measures, ways of marketing virtual goods through multi-level or networked marketing have raised some interest. This report is a first approach to multi-level markets for virtual goods from the viewpoint of theoretical economy. A generic, kinematic model for the monetary flow in multi-level markets, which quantitatively describes the incentives that buyers receive through resales revenues, is devised. Building on it, the competition of goods is examined in a dynamical, utility-theoretic model enabling, in particular, a treatment of the free-rider problem. The most important implications for the design of multi-level market mechanisms for virtual goods, or multi-level incentive management systems, are outlined. | |
| dc.description | 18 pages, 5 figures; graphics with reduced resolution. Full resolution available on author's homepage. Accepted contribution to the Workshop 'Virtual Goods' at the Conference AXMEDIS 2005, 30. November - 2. December, Florence, Italy | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0409028 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0409028 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/32334 | |
| dc.subject | Computer Science and Game Theory | |
| dc.subject | Computers and Society | |
| dc.subject | K.4.4 | |
| dc.title | Incentive Systems in Multi-Level Markets for Virtual Goods | |
| dc.type | text |