A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems

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Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. In this paper, we use ideas from Game Theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.

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Computer Science and Game Theory, H.4, J.4

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http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/31839

Consulte el texto completo en el siguiente enlace:

https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0310039
 http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0310039
 Proc. of the Third International Conference on P2P Computing (P2P2003), Linkoping Sweden, 2003

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arXiv