A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems

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dc.creatorBuragohain, Chiranjeeb
dc.creatorAgrawal, Divyakant
dc.creatorSuri, Subhash
dc.date2003-10-17
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T03:20:28Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T03:20:28Z
dc.descriptionPeer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. In this paper, we use ideas from Game Theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0310039
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0310039
dc.identifierProc. of the Third International Conference on P2P Computing (P2P2003), Linkoping Sweden, 2003
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/31839
dc.subjectComputer Science and Game Theory
dc.subjectH.4, J.4
dc.titleA Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
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