Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games

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Ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In these evolutionary game models, ownership status provides an endogenous asymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts.
See http://www.columbia.edu/~kky2001/ for related articles on author's personal web page

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Biological Physics, Computer Science and Game Theory, Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems, Cellular Automata and Lattice Gases, Physics and Society, Populations and Evolution

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http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/100043

Consulte el texto completo en el siguiente enlace:

https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0210125
 http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0210125
 International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 183-197, 2003

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arXiv